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This paper reviews the new ideas emerging from neuroscience regarding the question of why 
some people are compelled to use drugs.  During the process of drug exposure, the brain’s 
motivational system is changed in ways that co-opts the individual’s motivational system. 
Changes in the brain’s motivational structures along with changes in the brain’s self-regulatory 
structures compel an individual to drug use.   Ways to reverse those changes in an addicted 
brain have been identified, as have ways to enhance self-regulatory control.  The information 
from neuroscience offers a new perspective on “loss of control” as well as offering implications 
for treatment. 
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Several reasons exist for why social workers should be familiar with information emerging from 
neuroscience addressing the process of addiction.  First, neuroscientists have attempted to make 
findings from their government-funded research available to the public.  Social workers will 
probably receive inquiries from clients about the information they are hearing in the media.  
Second, findings from neuroscience have stimulated the development of new pharmaceutical 
interventions for treatment of addictions.  Many clients will have questions about how these 
treatments work.  Social workers should be prepared to answer their questions.  Finally, the 
details from neuroscience validate the article of faith presented in Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A) 
about addiction being a physical condition and not a matter of choice.  While A.A. explained 
alcoholism as an allergy to alcohol, through neuroscience, we have a better understanding of the 
nature of the physical processes removing choice from the process of addiction. 
The focus on biology does remove the humanness and the individual variation from the 
process of addiction.  Indeed, a reader of this paper stated: “There is something about reducing 
patients to biological beings, almost without unique qualities, that feels antithetical to social 
work practice.”  But, that is precisely why the neuroscience perspective offers a new perspective 
for social workers who are schooled in the importance of individual factors.  Addiction involves 
fundamental brain structures that evolved long ago.  In terms of the brain’s structures involved in 
addiction, all mammals (rodents, people, primates) share motivational structures that function 
similarly.  As with average body temperature and response to a cold virus, environmental factors 
such as culture and values do not affect these processes very much.  Genetic differences, 
environmental opportunities for drug use, and stress exposure certainly influences one’s risk for 
becoming addicted.  However, once an individual has become substance dependent, the addictive 
phenomenon at the level of the brain with accompanying compelled behavior is the same for all 
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mammals.  That is why addictions are so frightening.  That is why it is useful to think of 
addiction as a disease.  The automaticity of the reward-structure function dampens, even eclipses 
aspects of a person’s cultural heritage, values, and humanness.  These structures and their 
biochemistry are the strongest influences on an addict’s behavior, an addict’s desires, and an 
addict’s thought processes.  Knowledge of the biological underpinnings of addictions will 
hopefully render beginning practitioners much more respectful of the struggle their clients face 
and may also help clients appreciate why their compulsive drug use really is a disease.  The 
neuroscience perspective on addiction does paint a bleak picture.  However, social workers must 
remember that they have seen addicts recover.  Here is where culture, values, and human 
connection can come into play. 
This paper will review findings from neuroscience and related areas on the physical 
processes occurring as a person becomes addicted.  In the latter half of the paper, research is 
discussed that offers suggestions for altering physical processes in ways that foster sobriety.   
 
THE CHANGES IN FEELINGS AND BEHAVIOR MEDIATED BY DOPAMINE RELEASE 
 
Early in the field, addiction was defined by the presence of withdrawal symptoms and by the 
build-up of tolerance to a drug.  Modern ideas place greater emphasis on compulsion as the 
essential phenomenon in addiction (O’Brien, 2008), equating addiction with compulsive drug 
taking.  Researchers have identified changes associated with the development of compulsion.  
In 1987, Wise and Bozarth, neuroscientists, made the observation that all drugs resulting 
in compulsive use share the property of inducing release of dopamine by neurons whose cell 
bodies are located in the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) onto neurons in the shell of the Nucleus 
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Accumbens.  Earlier work had shown that the presentation of natural reinforcers (food and sex) 
or cues indicating that natural reinforcers are available, also induce release of dopamine into the 
shell of the Nucleus Accumbens and forebrain structures (Dackis & O’Brien, 2005; Montague, 
Hyman, Cohen, 2004; Nestler, 2005).  Dopamine connections from the VTA to the Nucleus 
Accumbens became known as the “reward circuitry,” because animals exert effortful responding 
to achieve a surge in dopamine from the VTA.  Moreover, these same structures had been 
identified as part of the circuitry for self-stimulation where animals would self-administer 
electrical impulses at seemingly endless rates (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Peciña, Smith, 
Berridge, 2006; Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Wise & Rompre, 1989). 
It was easy to move from the observation that animals would work for the release of 
dopamine into the Nucleus Accumbens, to the assumption that dopamine induced a state of 
pleasure in the animal.  However, it just turned out not to be true.  Kent Berridge’s work on 
reward structures challenged the idea that dopamine mediated the subjective state of pleasure. 
Moreover, in discrediting the idea that dopamine release mediates a pleasurable state, Berridge 
and colleagues, along with others, have been able to elucidate those functions that reward 
structures (dopaminergic projections from the VTA) do subserve. 
Several observations led Berridge and colleagues to abandon the idea that dopamine 
release mediates pleasure.  First, it was noted that dopamine is released in the shell of the 
Nucleus Accumbens if an animal is subjected to shock or restraint as well as when exposed to 
cues signaling the availability of food and drugs (Faure, Reynolds, Richard, & Berridge, 2008; 
Pruessner, Champagne, Meaney, & Dagher, 2004; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007).  
Second, dopamine continues to be released as an animal works for food and sex, but when the 
animal is eating or ejaculates, dopamine is no longer being released (Baldo & Kelley, 2007; 
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Berridge & Robinson, 1998).   Thirdly, when researchers destroyed the VTA, the animal 
continued to display signs of enjoying food if passively fed, but the animal would not work for 
the food (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Robinson & Berridge, 2008).  These observations led to 
the notion that dopamine release was about “wanting” rather than “liking.”  Thus, the usual 
motivation for behavior (when people feel good they repeat their behavior) cannot explain 
addiction.  
Subsequent work further refined the function of the reward circuits.  When an animal 
experiences a surge of dopamine release from the VTA, the animal becomes alert, intensely 
aware, and is in a state of readiness to make associations between environmental cues and 
behavior: the animal is ready to learn.  Further, those behaviors that lead to the dopamine surge 
will be repeated more avidly; that is, a compulsive behavior directed toward inducing more 
dopamine release is observed (Robinson & Berridge, 2008).  Berridge and colleagues (Robinson 
& Berridge, 1993) refer to this component of dopaminergic function as “incentive salience”.  
But, Robinson and Berridge (2008) caution that “incentive salience” is more than just learning. 
Many associations are learned (e.g., learning to tie a shoe to avoid tripping over a shoe lace) 
without resulting in compulsive behavior (Robinson & Berridge, 2008).   Thus, learning alone 
cannot account for compulsion.  However, even though incentive salience is more than learning, 
dopamine release does facilitate learning.  The VTA sends dopaminergic projections to the 
hippocampus, an area involved in creating memories.  Dopamine facilitates the changes in 
dendritic structure undergirding the creation of new memories (Lemon & Manahan-Vaughan, 
2006).   
Salmone and others have further refined the function of dopamine.  Effortful responding 
seems to require dopamine.  This conclusion rests on the following observations.  When 
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dopamine function is inhibited, animals switch their preference to unpalatable foods that they do 
not have to work for as opposed to better-tasting food that requires effort to obtain.  Animals 
whose levels of dopamine have been chemically depleted will actually consume more food that 
they do not have to work for than control animals (suggesting that dopamine is not affecting the 
pleasure associated with eating the food).  Rather, without dopamine, the cost of putting in effort 
is just too great.  To put it in colloquial terms, animals with inhibited dopamine tone are lazy and 
unmotivated (Font et al., 2008; Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007; Salamone & Correa, 2002; 
Salamone et al., 2007). 
Berridge’s recent research has identified brain structures and neurotransmitters that do 
mediate pleasure (Berridge, 2003; Berridge, 2007a; Berridge, 2007b; Berridge & Kringelbach, 
2008; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Peciña, Smith, & Berridge, 2006).  Berridge’s 
operational definition of pleasure was particular facial gestures which accompany the eating of 
preferred foods.  Through processes of injecting various neurotransmitters into various structures 
or destroying particular structures, and examining how these changes impacted signs of 
enjoyment, Berridge identified those brain structures involved in pleasure.  The parabrachial 
area, certain parts of the Nucleus Accumbens in the rostral and dorsal one-quarter of the medial 
shell (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008), and the Ventral Pallidum are critical structures for the 
experience of pleasure.  The neurotransmitters identified as enhancing pleasure are cannabinoids, 
GABA, and opioids.  Destruction of the ventral pallidum precludes signs of enjoyment (Berridge 
et al., 2009).  Destruction of areas involved in working for rewards, does not impact signs of 
enjoyment (Robinson & Berridge, 1993).  Thus, the bottom-line from Berridge and colleagues is 
that the “wanting” system is distinguishable from the “liking” system anatomically and 
chemically. 
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   KINDLING AND ADDICTION 
 
In addition to studies examining what happens in the brains of animals when they consume drugs 
that lead to compulsive use, researchers have also developed animal models for the process of 
becoming addicted.  They wanted to test their assumption that a brain that had been exposed to 
an addicting drug, e.g., a stimulant such as amphetamine or cocaine, is different from the brain of 
a naïve animal.  Consistent with the hypothesis, researchers noted that an animal given low doses 
of a stimulant drug over a series of days, will exhibit an increase in the amount of dopamine 
released from VTA neurons.  Moreover, the behavioral response to the stimulant also augments 
over time.  The same dose of stimulants will result in much more locomotion in a drug-
experienced animal than in a naïve animal (Robinson & Berridge, 1993).  In humans as well, 
repeated exposure to amphetamines results in sensitization of the response to the drug (Boileau et 
al., 2006; Leyton, 2007).   
In seeking to explain the sensitization process to the stimulant, researchers analogized the 
process to a process called “kindling” which had been observed in animals subjected to electrical 
stimulation of the brain.  If an animal is given a small dose of electrical stimulation over a series 
of days, the small dose will eventually elicit a seizure, although this dose would not be sufficient 
to elicit a seizure in a naïve animal (Post & Weiss, 1988).  Borrowing the term from the electrical 
stimulation research, the terms “kindling” and “sensitization” became interchangeable when 
referring to a brain that had been subjected to repeated doses of an addicting chemical over time. 
A kindled/sensitized animal exhibits changes in behavior in addition to just responding 
more strongly to an injection of the addicting drugs.  Exposure to cues associated with drug 
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delivery, trigger release of dopamine from the VTA (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).  Animals 
work assiduously for the delivery of their drug.  Essentially, the action of the brain’s 
motivational system gets hijacked by the drug.  This capture of the brain’s motivational system 
has many manifestations.   
The VTA sends projections to many structures in the brain, including the Prefrontal 
Cortex (PFC).  While parts of the PFC are involved in self-control and inhibiting strong impulses 
(to be discussed below), the PFC is also involved in planning for goal attainment and focusing 
attention in the face of distracting input.  The VTA, through dopaminergic input, updates the 
PFC about the current value of rewards.   The VTA, in a sense, informs the PFC about what 
thoughts should be brought to awareness (Montague et al., 2004).   
When drug-associated cues trigger the release of dopamine from the VTA to the PFC, the 
thinking processes of the individual get captured in the service of obtaining more drug (Dackis & 
O’Brien, 2005).  Distracting thoughts, perhaps about other goals, get gated out before reaching 
awareness.  Thoughts and planning relevant to the goal of obtaining more drug become 
automatic.  It just may not occur to the person to think about competing goals.  Planning for 
more drug use dominates the individual’s conscious awareness (Miller, 2000; Montague et al., 
2004).  Indeed, in addicted people, drug-associated imagery grabs attention. Their eyes move 
automatically to track the drug-associated images (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006).    
The VTA and the Nucleus Accumbens also projects to the anterior cingulate, an area in 
the PFC.  Cues associated with drug use will trigger the release of dopamine in the anterior 
cingulate.  The anterior cingulate is believed to mediate the subjective experience of craving.  
Once the anterior cingulate is activated, craving is experienced, which, of course, will bolster the 
urge for further drug-seeking (Dackis & O’Brien, 2005).  Indeed, for addicts, cocaine-associated 
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drug paraphernalia or memories of use induce activity in the anterior cingulate (Childress et al., 
1999; Kilts et al., 2001).  Recent evidence suggests that an area adjacent to the cingulate, the 
insula, may also play a role in craving (Naqvi & Bechara, 2009). 
During the process of kindling development, the Nucleus Accumbens plays a major role. 
With chronic use of a drug, the VTA augments release of dopamine to the dorsal striatum (a 
structure located above the Nucleus Accumbens and the VTA), where “must do” behavioral 
programs are activated (Belin & Everitt, 2008; Everitt et al., 2008; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; 
Volkow et al., 2006; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Once the VTA is activated, drug-seeking 
behavioral programs become much more automatic, and the individual’s behavioral routines for 
drug-seeking become activated. 
Drugs that augment dopamine function increase motivation across a broad range of 
activity.  When dopamine drugs are in the body, gusto for a wide variety of reinforcers is 
enhanced.  Not only will an animal on a stimulant work harder for drug delivery, but the animal 
will work harder for food and sex as well (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2007a; Nocjar 
& Panksepp, 2002; Robinson, & Berridge, 1993; 2008).  When people are given dopamine 
enhancing drugs, they also display increased goal directed activity for a wide variety of 
reinforcers.  Interestingly, for Parkinson’s disease patients who are treated with dopamine- 
enhancing drugs, gambling and hyper-sexuality often emerge as problems (Bostwick, Hecksel, 
Stevens, Bower, & Ahlskog, 2009; Dood et al., 2005; Stamey & Jankovic, 2008).  Then there are 
the long-term effects of having been exposed to stimulant drugs.  Animals whose brains have 
been kindled with stimulants display greater release of dopamine to both stress and natural 
reinforcers.  Moreover, exposure to a conditioned stimulus for a drug will induce working for a 
wide range of rewards (Berridge, et al., 2009).  The animal findings are observed in people as 
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well.  Bechara (2001; 2003) identified a subgroup of addicts who, when exposed to monetary 
rewards while sober, exhibit exaggerated autonomic responses (e.g., heart rate acceleration).  
Volkow and colleagues (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Volkow, Fowler, Wang, 2004) have 
proffered the hypothesis that addicts have an impaired capacity for motivation to seek natural 
rewards (food, sex, etc.).  They base this hypothesis on the lower level of activation of the 
anterior cingulate and PFC observed in addicts who may have been still in withdrawal, in 
response to erotic stimuli and other natural reinforcers (Aguilar de Arcos, Verdejo-Garcia, 
Peralta-Ramirez, Sanchez-Barrera, & Perez-García, 2005; Garavan et al., 2000).  The idea that 
addicts are hypo-responsive to natural reinforcers contradicts the notion that sensitization to 
drugs creates a cross-sensitization to other stimuli that activate the VTA: stress, sex, food.  It is 
possible that both phenomena are true.  During withdrawal, addicts are depleted in their 
dopamine reserves (Knoblich et al., 1992; Leyton, 2007; Schulteis & Koob, 1996).  With 
depleted dopamine reserves, cocaine addicts are less responsive to reward, even cocaine 
associated cues (Leyton, 2007).  Dopamine depletion long after cocaine addicts have 
discontinued drug use is evidenced by the finding that visual responses controlled by dopamine 
are aberrant long after sobriety (Desai, Roy, Brown, & Smelson, 1997; Roy, Roy, Williams, 
Weinberger, & Smelson, 1997).  Thus, until levels of dopamine are restored, some addicts in 
withdrawal may be hypo-responsive rather than hyper-responsive to natural rewards.   
 
CHANGES IN AN ADDICTED BRAIN PREDISPOSING TO RELAPSE 
 
The operational definition of a kindled/sensitized brain is that in response to a stimulant drug, an 
exaggerated release of dopamine from neurons in the VTA is observed.  It is now appreciated 
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that many changes are evident in the brains of animals who have received low doses of 
stimulants (both passively or after lever-pressing) over a period of time (Kalivas, 2005).
 
Clinically, perhaps the most troubling aspect of addiction is that even after long periods 
of sobriety, people relapse.  Researchers have modeled the phenomenon of relapse in animals.  
After kindling the brain with stimulants, researchers have extinguished lever-pressing for the 
drug by failing to provide the stimulant following lever-pressing.  Animals whose drug-seeking 
has been extinguished, can once again be induced to lever-press for drugs through three 
procedures:  (1) delivery of a priming dose of stimulant; (2) presentation of a cue, such as a light 
that was present when the animal learned to lever-press for the stimulant; or (3) exposure to a 
stressor such as shock (Kalivas, Volkow, Seamans, 2005).  In examining the many changes in 
the brains of addicted animals, researchers have sought to identify two types of changes:  those 
changes that sustain working for drug delivery; and those that reinstate working for drug delivery 
after extinction (Kalivas, 2005).   
While we have focused on the dopaminergic system, cues associated with drug use 
become understood by higher structures in the brain, parts of the cortex.  Then a signal is sent 
from the cortex to the motivational structures.  At this point, glutamate, the brains primary 
excitatory neurotransmitter, comes into play.  Studies blocking the delivery of glutamate (a 
neurotransmitter) to neurons in the core of the Nucleus Accumbens from neurons in the 
dorsomedial PFC suggest that glutamate is required for the reinstatement of drug-seeking after 
extinction (Cornish & Kalivas, 2000; Di Ciano & Everitt, 2001; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; 
Knacksted & Kalivas, 2009; McFarland, Lapish, & Kalivas, 2003).    Moreover, it was noted that 
elevated levels of glutamate are released on the cells into the core of the Accumbens from 
neurons in the PFC in the brains of addicted animals (Kalivas et al., 2003).   
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Next, Kalivas and his colleagues wanted to identify the changes that might break the 
chains of an addicted animal.  They knew, as indicated above, that high levels of glutamate 
delivered to the core of the Nucleus Accumbens are associated with drug reinstatement.  But, 
what accounts for the elevated level of glutamate to the core of the Nucleus Accumbens in an 
addicted animal?  Perhaps if the reasons for the enhanced glutamate could be found, something 
could be done to alter the addicted brain so drug relapse would not occur. In this regard, Kalivas 
and colleagues found that an exchanger protein that moves glutamate out of the cell while 
moving cysteine (an amino acid) into the cell operates slowly in addicted animals.  
Kalivas’ research does have practical implications.  It has led to the discovery of genetic 
variations predisposing individuals to addiction to stimulants.  Persons with particular variants of 
Homer proteins, associated with the level of the exchanger present in the brain, are more 
susceptible to addiction to cocaine (Dahl et al., 2005; Szumlinski, Ary, & Lominac, 2008).  
Moreover, delivery of a synthetic version of cysteine called N-acetylcysteine can induce the 
cysteine/glutamate exchanger protein to function more rapidly than it would in untreated 
addicted animals.  Given the trigger of drug cues, less glutamate is released into the core of the 
Nucleus Accumbens, and drug-seeking-reinstatement is abrogated (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005; 
McFarland et al., 2003; Moussawi et al., 2009). In regard to people, N-acetylcysteine (which 
causes the cysteine/glutamate exchangers to function at a faster rate) has demonstrated efficacy 
in the treatment of compulsive gambling and cocaine addiction (Larow et al, 2006; Grant, Kim, 
& Odlaug, 2007).  It reduces cravings to cocaine drug cues (LaRowe et al., 2007) and reduces 
impulses to gamble by 40% (Grant, et al., 2007). 
Reasons exist for believing that N-aceytlcysteine will be a major improvement over past 
pharmacological interventions.  Although drugs (naloxone, acamprosate, modafinil) are available 
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to reduce cravings given exposure to drug cues, the mechanism of action of these therapeutic 
drugs is to alter the general operation of the brain. While naloxone can reduce the craving for 
cocaine triggered by conditioned stimuli, naloxone also reduces desire for natural rewards, as 
well as inducing lethargy and cognitive slowing (Williams & Woods, 1999; Physician’s Desk 
Reference, 1995, p. 967).  Moreover, in animals, naloxone induces conditioned place aversion 
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998).  Similarly, acamprosate, a drug which will reduce the expression 
of particular subunits of receptors for glutamate, will decrease glutamate signaling generally, 
although evidence for a major impact on reward system is scant (DeWitte, Littleton, Parot, & 
Koob, 2005).  Modafinil similarly alters glutamate signaling (Dackis, Kampman, Lynch, 
Pettinati, & O’Brien, 2005).  In contrast, N-acetylcysteine intervenes in a targeted way to reverse 
alterations specific to a kindled brain. 
 N-acetylcysteine is sold in health food stores.  It is used in the treatment of 
acetaminophen overdose, cystic fibrosis, and chronic obstructive lung disease.  No major adverse 
effects have been noted, although transient nausea, vomiting, and flatulence have been observed 
(LaRowe et al., 2006).  It will be interesting to observe whether N-acetylcysteine will become a 
major treatment for addiction.  
 
 
 
CONTROL OVER MOTIVATIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
Berridge and Kalivas have focused on changes in the reward structures in an addicted animal.  
Changes in reward structures can explain why there is a strong drive to seek a drug.  In a sense 
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the addicted brain has learned too well (Hyman, 2005; Kelley, 2004). But, many believe that 
changes in the reward structures provide only half the story.  Overwhelming compulsion arises 
from contributions of a more intense motivational system (strong impulse) along with a failure of 
brain structures to inhibit the dopaminergic motivational system (Jentsch & Taylor, 1999).  
When considering the factors that result in compulsive drug taking, attention to inhibitory control 
over impulses should be examined.   
In the literature, problems with impulse control have been operationalized in various 
ways including repetitive behaviors, inability to delay gratification, inability to suppress strong 
initial impulses, lack of premeditation prior to action, insufficient sampling of relevant 
information prior to decision making, and resistance to extinction (Garavan, Kaufman, & Hester, 
2008).  As a group, substance abusers and gamblers have problems with impulse control.  They 
prefer immediate, small rewards to larger, delayed rewards (Bechara, 2005; Coffey, Gudleski, 
Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Simon, Mendex, & Setlow, 2007).  They think less before making 
decisions (Bechara, 2005; Bechara, Noel, & Crone, 2006) and perform more poorly on tests that 
require the blocking out of distractions (e.g., the Stroop test) (Crone, Cutshall, Recknor, Van den 
Wildenberg, & Bechara, 2003; Potenza et al., 2003).  They are motorically hyperactive and have 
trouble inhibiting responses (Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2007; Hester & Garavan, 
2004; Garavan & Stout, 2005).  They have trouble with tasks involving withholding a response 
to particular stimuli (Beveridge, Gill, Hanlon, & Porrino, 2008).  They make riskier choices 
(Fishbein, 2005; Verdejo-García, Perales, & Perez-García, 2007).  They fail to respond to 
feedback indicating they made a bad choice and display reduced awareness of having made 
errors (Garavan & Stout, 2005).   
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Researchers have identified brain structures and neurotransmitters involved in inhibiting 
impulses and behavior (Dalley, Cardinal, Robbins, 2004).  Serotonin is believed to play a large 
role in inhibiting impulses (Brewer & Potenza, 2008; Bizot, Le Bihan, Puech, Hamon, & 
Thiébot, 1999).  Areas in the PFC are believed to house structures allowing for executive 
function and self-regulation.  With damage to the ventromedial PFC, a loss of self-directed 
behavior in favor of more automatic sensory-driven behavior ensues (Bechara, 2005).  
Consistent with the poor performance on tasks requiring inhibitory control, substance 
abusers show deficiencies in the inhibitory systems which might counteract strong motivational 
impulses (Bechara, 2005; Garavan & Stout, 2005).  Alcoholics who have a stronger family 
predisposition to alcoholism (early onsetters), have lower levels of serotonin metabolites in the 
cerebrospinal fluid (Fils-Aime et al.,1996).  During tasks requiring inhibition and executive 
function, stimulant addicts display lower levels of metabolism and blood flow in the PFC 
(Beveridge, et al., 2008; Garavan & Stout, 2005).  Lower levels of activation of areas in the PFC 
(ventromedial PFC, left posterior cingulate cortex, and the right striatum) during tasks requiring 
cognitive control, predict post-treatment abstention from cocaine (Brewer, Worhunksy, Carrol, 
Rounsaville & Potenza, 2008).   
Presently, it is unclear whether problems with impulse control precede or follow 
exposure to drugs (Beveridge et al., 2008; Garavan et al., 2008).  However, the finding that 
similar changes in PFC are observed in primates after drug exposure, suggest that chronic 
stimulant use can impair PFC function (Beveridge, et  al., 2008). Ironically, the initial, short-term 
impact of stimulants improves impulse control (Fillmore, Rush, & Hays, 2005; Garavan et al., 
2008; Wade, de Wit, & Richards, 2000), while resulting in impaired control with chronic use 
(Franklin et al., 2002).  Regardless of the reason for poor executive control (also referred to as 
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self-regulation), strengthening self-regulatory control should be addressed in treatment as will be 
discussed in the final section of this paper.   
 
           PREDISPOSING FACTORS TO BECOMING ADDICTED 
 
Genetic contributions account for 60% of the risk for substance abuse (Kreek, Bart et al., 2005; 
Kreek, Nielesen, et al., 2005).  Identifying the gene variants and temperaments that place persons 
at higher risk for substance abuse is important for two reasons:  First, once the function of the 
protein variant promoting addiction is elucidated, interventions to reduce the risk might be 
found; Second, prevention efforts can be developed that are particularly influential for persons 
with temperaments that place them at risk for drug abuse.     
Compulsive drug use arises from contributions of a more intense motivational system 
along with a failure of structures in the PFC to inhibit the dopaminergic motivational system.  
Allelic variations (i.e., variation in the version of a gene that a person inherits) in genes 
specifying proteins functioning in the dopaminergic structures and genes specifying proteins 
whose functions are relevant to inhibitory structures, have been examined.  Some of the allelic 
variants seem to be implicated in both the function of dopamine structures as well as a less 
inhibited temperament.  While it is beyond the scope of this article to survey all of the genes 
identified as increasing the risk for addiction, some of the more prominent variations with clear 
relevance to dopaminergic reward structure or executive function are mentioned. 
With regard to functions of the dopaminergic motivational structures, alleles of the 
dopamine 4 receptor, the dopamine 2 receptor, and the dopamine transporter predict substance 
abuse as well as Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Brewer & Portenza, 2008).  In both 
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rodents and humans, hyperactivity and impulsivity increase the speed of developing compulsive 
drug use (Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008; Boileau et al., 2006; Verdejo-García, 
Lawrence, & Clark, 2008). Poor impulse control at age 10 to 12 predicts drug use at age 19 
(Tarter et al., 2003).   Allelic variations in genes related to serotonin function have been studied 
with regard to impulsivity, but findings have been somewhat inconsistent (Kreek et al., 2005; 
Verdejo-García et al., 2008). 
 Volkow, the director of NIDAA, has focused on Type 2 dopamine receptors.  Type 2 
receptors for dopamine (D2R) are expressed in the Nucleus Accumbens and the Striatum (an 
area to which the N. Accumbens projects).  With regard to function, D2R are found on the axons 
of dopamine neurons and decrease the probability of the neuron’s firing.  D2R are therefore 
probably inhibitory to the dopamine system (Goodman, 2008), although not always appreciated 
as such (Nader, Czoty, Gould, & Riddick, 2008; Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2004).   The density 
of D2R observed in the striatum has significance for substance abuse.  Those drug-naive persons 
with low density of D2R in the striatum experience cocaine more positively (Volkow et al., 
2004; Volkow, Wang et al., 2002).  This is consistent with animal findings.  Rats that more 
avidly self-administer stimulants have lower D2R density in the Nucleus Accumbens (Dalley et 
al., 2007), as do monkeys (Nader, et al., 2006).    D2R density also relates to temperament.  In 
rats, those with low D2R density in the Nucleus Accumbens are more impulsive (Dalley et al., 
2007).  In humans, those who are at genetic risk for low D2R density are similarly more 
impulsive (Verdejo-García et al., 2008).  For impulsive people, the Taq1 allele for the D2 
receptor is less readily expressed and may therefore serve to identify those with lower D2R 
density (Pohjalainen et al, 1998).  However, environmental influences can also influence the 
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density of the D2R in relevant structures.  Stimulant drugs will lower D2R density (Dalley et al., 
2007). 
 While D2R receptor density is relevant for the function of structures in the dopaminergic 
reward/motivation systems, D2R density is related to the function of brain structures involved in 
self-regulation as well (Volkow et al., 2004; Volkow et al., 1993).   
  Life experiences may also place individuals at risk for addiction.  In the early work on 
kindling the brain in rodents, it was noted that extreme stressors can also result in an augmented 
release of dopamine released by neurons in the VTA onto neurons in the Nucleus Accumbens.  
Thus, previous exposure to strong stressors can kindle the brain and elevate the risk for 
becoming addicted, given drug consumption (Robinson & Berridge, 1993).  Michael Meaney has 
focused on the impact of early maternal deprivation on the brain. Early maternal deprivation is 
associated with a stronger response to stress.  Among those individuals with early maternal 
deprivation, more dopamine is released into the N. Accumbens when they are given a stressful 
task to perform (Pruessner et al., 2004).  The brains of those animals experiencing early 
deprivation operate as if they were previously kindled.  Thus, persons who were neglected or 
abused as children can be expected to be at risk as well.  This prediction is consistent with 
findings in the literature indicating that child abuse does elevate the risk for addiction (Shipman 
& Taussiq, 2009). 
How individuals developing addictions because of a genetic predisposition differ from 
addicts without a genetic predisposition, has been addressed in the literature on alcoholism.  On 
average, alcoholics with a genetic pedagogy develop alcoholism much earlier in life.  Often, they 
cannot identify a period in their lives when they drank in a controlled fashion.  They display 
compulsion very soon after being introduced to alcohol (Littrell, 1991a).  Evidence suggesting 
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that treatments should vary for those with a genetic predisposition versus those without has not 
emerged.  But, certainly prevention efforts for the children of those addicts with a strong family 
history should be made. 
 
   IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT 
 
Addiction to drugs involves both triggering of craving and intense urges through the VTA along 
with a failure of inhibition of these impulses.  In treating substance abusers, strategies should be 
developed to avoid triggering strong urges and craving.  Since it may be impossible to totally 
avoid triggering urges, ways to self-regulate or inhibit these urges need to be developed.  Thus, 
improving self-regulation is a goal of effective treatment.   
 
Avoiding the Triggering of the VTA and Enhancing Coping When It Is Triggered  
 
The animal research has identified reliable triggers to drug-seeking reinstatement.  Stress, a small 
amount of the drug, and environmental cues previously associated with drug use, will trigger 
release of dopamine from the VTA and will initiate drug-seeking.  The triggers for drug 
reinstatement in animals are mirrored in the relapse precipitants literature.  Stressful events are 
the most frequent precipitant to relapse (Littrell, 1991b).  Exposure to drug cues can precipitate 
relapse (Robinson & Berridge, 2008), and A.A. recommendations include the avoidance of 
“slippery places.”  A.A.’s acronym, HALT, admonishes that members should avoid being 
hungry, angry, lonely, or tired.  At least for the hunger component, ghrelin, a hormone released 
during food deprivation, can activate the VTA (Abizaid et al., 2006; Cummings, Naleid, & 
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Lattemann, 2007; Jerlhag  et al., 2007; Tessari et al., 2007).  Moreover, glucose deprivation is 
associated with release of dopamine into the Nucleus Accumbens  (Adler et al., 2000).  Thus, 
neuroscience research suggests that A.A.’s admonition to avoid hunger is good advice. 
 During treatment, it is important to identify personal triggers.  These triggers might be 
external cues (being with a former drug partner, returning to an old neighborhood, TV 
advertisements) or internal cues (experiencing urges, experiencing stress).  When possible, 
triggers should be avoided.  However, it may not always be possible to avoid all triggers.  Then, 
the objective is to link coping skills to these triggers (Carroll & Onken, 2005).   
While treatment involves developing awareness of triggers, it is important not to spend 
much time describing or remembering the triggers.  Focusing on what Mischel and Ayduk 
(2004) refer to as the “hot” dimensions of urges and cues will activate the automatic, drug-
seeking behavioral programs.  Focusing on the “what to do instead” recruits more self-regulation 
and executive function.  Walter Mischel and colleagues have studied the process of self-
regulation in children.  Mischel examined how some children were able to delay gratification, 
choosing to deny themselves an immediate delicious treat in order to eat a larger treat later.  
Those children who were able to restrain from eating a delicious treat immediately, employed 
distracters and spent less time attending to their eventual reward (eating the treat) (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999).  They avoided dwelling on the hot dimensions of eventual success and focused 
on cold distracters of “what to do right now”.  Extrapolating from these findings, focusing on 
what to do instead might be more successful than dwelling on urges. 
A.A. has gainsaid the importance of a lack of willpower in explaining drug-seeking 
(Littrell, 1991b).  A.A. seems to regard willpower as a trait with which one is born.  Mischel and 
Ayduck (2004) view willpower as a coping skill.  In addition to research on delay of 
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gratification, Mischel examined the behavior of children who were able to solve more math 
problems while resisting playing with an attractive toy.  Those children who were better able to 
resist the toy did not differ in the number of times they gazed at the toy. Rather, they made more 
self-statements directing themselves back to the math problems. Consistent with the findings on 
delay of gratification, those children who were able to resist eating delicious food focused on the 
cold features of the candy bar (the slick wrapper) rather than imagining the hot features 
(delicious taste) of the candy bar (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  Additionally, if children were 
given a specific task to think about, they could better refrain from eating the delicious food 
(Littrell, 1991b; Mischel & Ayduck, 2004).  This research has demonstrated that where a person 
focuses his/her attention is a modifiable skill.  Since judicious focusing can function to delay 
gratification, modifying a person’s attention patterns can bring about (in lay terms) an increase in 
willpower. 
 
Ways to Increase Executive Control 
 
The general issue of self-regulation has emerged as a focus of research in both neuroscience and 
social psychology.  A recent October 2008 National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) sponsored 
conference at Colombia University (Transdisciplinary Approaches to Mechanisms of Behavior 
Change in Alcohol:  Connecting Basic Science Discoveries to Behavior Change Research), 
focused on the topic of self-regulation/executive control. When addressing the topic of self-
regulation/executive control, the function of the PFC is relevant.  By bringing in the function of 
the PFC, links to seemingly unrelated areas of research are introduced.  Parasympathetic tone is 
linked to the function of the PFC and to self-regulation/executive control. 
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Parasympathetic Tone  
 
Parasympathetic tone, measured by greater heart rate variability (HRV), has been a focus of 
attention in its own right (Porges, 2007; 2009).  It helps to know a bit about the parasympathetic 
nervous system.  Control over the heart and other organs is exercised by the autonomic nervous 
system.  The autonomic nervous system has two branches:  the parasympathetic nervous system 
(PNS)  and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS).  The PNS decreases heart rate and increases 
heart rate variability (variability in the time elapsed between beats) to ensure better coordination 
with breathing.  The SNS has the opposite effect (Porges, 2007; 2009). 
It has long been known that greater heart rate variability is a protective factor against 
cardiovascular disease (Hayano et al., 1990; Hayano, Yasuma, Okada, Mukai, & Fujinami, 
1996).  In fact, the same areas of the brain mediating self-regulation/executive-control also 
regulate parasympathetic control over bodily functions (Ahern et al., 2001; Thayer, 2006; Thayer 
& Lane, 2000).  Recent research connects greater heart rate variability with stronger PFC 
function and better executive control.  Those individuals with greater heart rate variability are 
better able to take turns; to inhibit strong impulses; to cope with stressors; and to better focus 
attention (Allen, Matthews, & Kenyon, 2000; Fabes & Eisenberg, 1997; Hansen, Johnsen, & 
Thayer, 2003; Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). HRV also relates to self-regulation capacity in 
addicts.  Those alcoholics who display greater increase in heart rate variability during exposure 
to drinking cues report stronger self-efficacy in refraining from drinking (Ingjaldsson, Laberg, & 
Thayer, 2003). 
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There is reason to believe that during the process of exerting self-regulation, that is, in 
activating relevant areas of the PFC, parasympathetic tone (as evidenced by greater HRV) 
increases as well. Segerstrom and Solberg Nes (2007) monitored heart rate variability as 
individuals performed a task requiring self-regulation.  As persons successfully performed the 
task, their HRV increased.  This contrasted with tasks during which the research-participant’s 
self-esteem was threatened.  During threats to self-esteem, HRV decreased. 
 Of course, if HRV reflects activity of brain areas related to executive control, strategies 
for enhancing HRV becomes relevant for treatment of substance abusers.  While differences 
among people in heart rate variability are to some extent inherited (Smoller, et al., 2008), 
environmental factors can influence heart rate variability.  Inexpensive biofeedback equipment 
has been successfully used to increase heart rate variability, which improved the lung function of 
patients with asthma (Lehrer et al., 2006; Lehrer, et al., 2003).  No doubt, in the future, 
biofeedback for increasing heart rate variability will be evaluated in the treatment of addictions 
as well.  Beyond biofeedback, aerobic exercise increases HRV, as does  performance on tests 
requiring executive function (Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, Stenvik, & Thayer, 2004). 
There is also reason to believe that attending A.A. may increase heart rate variability and, 
by extension executive control.  Oxytocin is a hormone released by the hypothalamus that 
enhances bonding both to offspring and sexual partners.  Not only is oxytocin released during 
nursing and orgasm, but it is also released given social cues suggesting that a person is trusted 
and accepted by a group (Porges, 2007; Zak, Kurban, & Matzner, 2004).  Interestingly, 
preliminary data suggest that oxytocin increases heart rate variability (Carter, Grippo, 
Pournajafi-Nazarloo, Ruscio, & Porges, 2008; Grippo, Carter, & Porges, 2007).   A.A. 
attendance does decrease drug relapse (Littrell, 1991b).  One mechanism of action might be 
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through an increase in oxytocin, which then improves executive control over behavior.  The 
following chain of events occurs:  Trust and bonding during A.A. meetings stimulates the release 
of oxytocin.  The oxytocin induces greater activity in the PFC reflected in better impulse control 
and greater heart rate variability.  With greater impulse control, a break is placed on the 
automatic urges to use emanating from activation of the motivational structures of the brain. 
In the future, directing attention to deliberately strengthening HRV might improve 
outcomes in substance abuse treatment.  Indeed, Alan Marlatt has shown that meditation was 
effective in reducing substance use after release from prison in Washington State (Simpson et al., 
2007).  Meditation changes breathing patterns in a manner similar to changes observed with 
biofeedback training done by Lehrer.  Thus, there is strong reason for suspecting that meditation 
training can increase heart rate variability, as does biofeedback training. Thus, incorporating 
meditation into treatment programs may prove to be an effective strategy for increasing HRV 
which in turn will enhance self-regulation, which will decrease risk of relapse.    
 
Self-regulation as a Limited Resource   
 
Self-regulation (a term for executive control) has emerged as a focus of research in social 
psychology as well.  This area of research is linked to research on HRV, but here researchers 
have been concerned with more deliberate efforts to self-regulate.  As will be discussed, the 
research on self-regulation bolsters support for the HALT acronym from A.A.  Some of the 
results of this research are detailed below because knowledge of the parameters governing the 
deliberate processes of self-regulation may allow for improved strategies for avoiding relapse.   
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Self-regulation entails a deliberate, conscious, and effortful process.  Research suggests 
that capacity for self-regulation operates as a limited resource (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2004).  If you exert a great deal of effort focusing attention, delaying 
gratification, denying an urge, or making hard choices, the next urge is harder to deny and you 
become less efficient at focusing on the next task.  For example, Baumeister and colleagues 
found that people who resisted eating freshly baked cookies were less productive in solving math 
problems than were people who had indulged (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004).  Suppressing a 
forbidden thought weakens ability to stifle laughter afterward (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  On any given occasion, capacity for exercising self-regulation can be 
depleted.  
One reason why self-regulation operates as a limited resource may involve glucose 
regulation.  Exerting self-control consumes a great deal of glucose and persons who start out 
with high levels of blood glucose are better at exerting self-control (Gailliot, 2008).  
Consumption of a glucose drink can offset the depletion of the limited resource of self-control 
(Gailliot et al. 2007).  Since sleep deprivation depletes brain glucose reserves, this might be the 
mechanism through which sleep deprivation leads to impaired impulse control (Gailliot, 2008).  
Thus, the research on self-regulation vindicates A.A.’s advice to avoid being hungry or tired.  
Either condition will vitiate the limited resource of self-regulatory capacity, making relapse in 
the face of temptations to use substances more likely. 
Baumeister analogizes self-regulation with the operation of muscles in the body.  
Although on any given day self-control is a limited resource, in the long run, you can build 
capacity.  Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall & Oaten (2006) found that those persons randomly 
assigned to practice exhibiting self-control, were better at self-control a week later than those 
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with no prior practice.  Executive control resources can be bolstered by positive moods and 
laughter (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007).  However, loud noises, crowds, 
frustrations, or being treated unfairly can vitiate self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  
Thus, A.A.’s advice to avoid bad moods (e.g., anger and loneliness) is also supported because 
good moods foster self-regulation, whereas bad moods diminish regulatory capacity. 
While self-regulation is a deliberate, effortful process, people may not always be aware 
of when their self-regulatory effort is declining (Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007).  However, 
decreases in heart rate variability may signal less activity in PFC mediating self-regulation.  In 
the future, devices to measure HRV might be developed to warn addicts in recovery when self-
regulation is flagging (Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007).  Within limits, given a warning, 
persons can consciously engage a greater level of self-regulation and overcome faltering efforts 
(Martijin, Tenbult, Merckelbach, Dreezens, & de Vries, 2002; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003).  
Thus, the research on self-regulation offers suggestions for heightening self-awareness of 
vulnerability to relapse so that prevention strategies (e.g., attending an A.A. meeting) can be 
engaged. 
 
Making Coping Behaviors Automatic   
 
Drug cues can activate the dopaminergic circuits and precipitate drug-seeking.  Dopaminergic 
circuits activate the anterior cingulate and the behavioral routines for drug-seeking (believed to 
reside in the dorsal striatum) in a reflexive, automatic fashion (Belin & Everitt, 2008; Everitt & 
Robbins, 2005; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Thoughts about protecting sobriety may not come into 
awareness.  Once cued by environmental stimuli, drug-seeking is automatic.  However, the fact 
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that many people are able to quit using drugs implies that it is possible to find ways to impede 
automatic behavioral routines.  The hope is to find strategies for making behavioral routines for 
coping skills in the face of drug cues, just as automatic as those driving drug-seeking (Palfai, 
2004; Palfai, 2006).  Whereas the deliberate, conscious process of self-regulation as described by 
Baumeister operates as a limited resource, automatic routines may not operate as limited 
resources (Webb & Sheeran, 2003). 
 Research suggests ways to enhance the automaticity of sobriety-promoting behaviors.  
Bargh’s work has focused on situational cues that can raise specific motivations in an 
individual’s hierarchy of motivations (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 
2001).  For example, by embedding the word “mastery” in a word list, subjects were primed to 
enhance their performance on a verbal task.  The primed subjects actually performed better than 
those subjects not receiving the prime.  Primes can activate goals and behavior to achieve a 
particular goal, even when the individual is not consciously aware of the cue that primes the 
motivated behavior (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh et al., 2001).  
Applying this principle to preventing relapse, having many reminders of valuing sobriety (e.g., 
sobriety birthday chips in one’s pocket) might prime executive control and behaviors which are 
incompatible with drug use (e.g., attending aftercare or A.A. meetings).  Research suggests that 
when a goal is primed, the cognitive availability of means to alternative goals decline (Shah, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).  Thus, priming sobriety goals can attenuate drug-seeking goals. 
Gollwitzer and colleagues have performed experiments to identify optimal strategies for 
increasing the automaticity of coping mechanisms.  A process of identifying specific behavioral 
plans for reaching goals has been shown to be superior to merely identifying goals (Gollwitzer 
Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004).  Describing situational cues beckoning one to go astray and 
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articulating behaviors to be implemented in the event of situational cues to stray (if-then plans) 
improves outcomes.  Of course, generating many alternative coping behaviors, in case one fails, 
will enhance the probability of success.  For relapse prevention then, the strategy is articulating 
specific behaviors to be implemented in tempting situations, including many alternative 
behaviors, and practicing them both in role play and in imagination.  At the critical moment, the 
rehearsed coping mechanism should be automatic. These strategies improve self-confidence and 
persistence in reaching one’s goal (Gollwitzer et al., 2004).  In the course of treatment, social 
workers should be deliberate about incorporating specific plans to counter temptations to relapse 
into their work with clients.   
 
     CONCLUSION   
 
As neuroscience has identified the mechanisms underpinning drug-seeking, clinical 
interventions have been suggested.  Physical processes involved in better self-regulation have 
been identified.  Treatments for enhancing self-regulation have been suggested.  In the near 
future, more ways to treat addiction emerging from neuroscience research will most likely 
evolve.  Moreover, many of the neuroscience findings have validated the wisdom of some central 
A.A. teachings and interventions that have long been utilized by social work clinicians in the 
field of addiction.  
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